

Brian C. Rocca, Bar No. 221576
brian.rocca@morganlewis.com
Sujal J. Shah, Bar No. 215230
sujal.shah@morganlewis.com
Michelle Park Chiu, Bar No. 248421
michelle.chiu@morganlewis.com
Minna Lo Naranjo, Bar No. 259005
minna.naranjo@morganlewis.com
Rishi P. Satia, Bar No. 301958
rishi.satia@morganlewis.com
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
One Market, Spear Street Tower
San Francisco, CA 94105-1596
Telephone: (415) 442-1000
Facsimile: (415) 442-1001

Richard S. Taffet, *pro hac vice forthcoming*
richard.taffet@morganlewis.com
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
101 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10178-0060
Telephone: (212) 309-6000
Facsimile: (212) 309-6001

Willard K. Tom, *pro hac vice forthcoming*
willard.tom@morganlewis.com
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20004-2541
Telephone: (202) 739-3000
Facsimile: (202) 739-3001

Attorneys for Google LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
OAKLAND DIVISION

DONALD R. CAMERON, et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

APPLE INC.,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:19-cv-03074-YGR

**GOOGLE LLC'S RESPONSE TO SUA
SPONTE JUDICIAL REFERRAL FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING
RELATIONSHIP OF CASES**

Pursuant to Civil L.R. 3-12(c) and (e), Google LLC (“Google”) responds to the Sua Sponte Judicial Referral for Purposes of Determining Relationship of Cases ordered by Judge Chen in *Pure Sweat Basketball, Inc. v. Google LLC, et al.*, No. 20-cv-05792-EMC (N.D. Cal) (“*PSB-Google*”), ECF 16. Judge Chen has referred *PSB-Google* to Judge Donato and Judge Gonzalez Rogers to determine whether it is related to: *Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC et al.*, No. C-20-5671-JD (“*Epic-Google*”); *Cameron et al v. Apple Inc.*, No. C-19-3074-YGR (“*Cameron-Apple*”); or *Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc.*, No. C-20-5640-YGR (“*Epic-Apple*”).

For completeness, Google advises the Court that two other actions should also be considered for “relation” under Local Rule 3-12: *Feitelson v. Google Inc.*, No. 14-cv-02007 (“*Feitelson-Google*”)¹, which “was pending” before Judge Freeman; and *Carr v. Google LLC*, No. 20-CV-05761 (“*Carr-Google*”), which “is pending” before Judge Freeman.

As a threshold matter, Google believes the three Android-related cases filed recently—*Epic-Google* (Donato, J.), *Carr-Google* (Freeman, J.) and *PSB-Google* (Chen, J.)—all “relate” to each other under Local Rule 3-12(a). Solely for convenience and purposes of this Response, Google refers to these actions as “the Android/Google Cases.” Google also notes that under Local Rule 3-12, these three cases may be related to the earlier-filed Android case, *Feitelson-Google* (Freeman, J.), an action that “was pending in this District.” Civ. L.R. 3-12(b).

Google respectfully opposes relation of the Android/Google Cases to *Cameron-Apple* or *Epic-Apple* (together, for purposes of this Response, the “iOS/Apple Cases”). Although Android and iOS compete to attract app developers and end users, Google (through Android) and Apple (through iOS) use different business models, agreements, and policies to support competing ecosystems. The Android/Google Cases and iOS/Apple Cases thus do not concern “substantially the same parties, property, transaction or event.” Civ. L.R. 3-12(a)(1). Moreover, the cases sit in markedly different procedural postures—Google has not been served with the Complaints in *Epic-Google* and *Carr-Google*, and only two of five Google defendants have been served in *PSB-Google* (on August 21, 2020), whereas Apple has been engaged in continuous iOS-related

¹ The *PSB-Google* complaint cites to the *Feitelson-Google* complaint when referencing relevant Mobile Application Distribution Agreements (“MADAs”). *PSB-Google* Complaint, ¶ 69 n.75.

litigation since 2011. It is therefore unlikely that conducting the Android/Google Cases and iOS/Apple Cases before different Judges will lead to “unduly burdensome duplication of labor and expense or conflicting results.” Civ. L.R. 3-12(a)(2).

DISCUSSION

An action is related to another when (1) the actions concern substantially the same parties, property, transaction, or event; and (2) it appears likely that there will be an unduly burdensome duplication of labor and expense or conflicting results if the cases are conducted before different judges. Civ. L.R. 3-12(a). The rule applies to any potentially related action “which is or was pending in this District.” Civ. L.R. 3-12(b) (emphasis added).

I. The Android/Google Cases Should Not Be Related To the iOS/Apple Cases

The Android/Google Cases and the iOS/Apple Cases lack the requisite “substantial” parity in parties, transactions, and operative facts. This Court has rejected relation of cases even where parties and claims were far more similar than they are here. *See Tecson v. Lyft*, No. 18-cv-06782, 2019 WL 1903263, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2019) (Gonzalez Rogers, J.) (finding that TCPA cases against the *same* defendant did “not suffice to meet the substantial similarity threshold” because the cases involved “different facts and claims so the judge in each case would be focused on resolving separate issues of law and fact for different parties”).

Different Parties, Property, Transactions, and Events. The defendants in the Android/Google Cases are different from the defendants in the iOS/Apple Cases. This is significant; it means there is virtually no overlap in the “property, transactions, or event[s]” at issue. Civ. L.R. 3-12(a). This Court has recognized in the iOS/Apple Cases that having the same defendant in those cases resulted in “each case stem[ming] from the use of the exact same technology and the economics regarding the same technology.” *Pepper v. Apple*, No. 11-cv-06714-YGR, 2019 WL 4783951, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2019) (Gonazalez Rogers, J.) (finding “significant economies” in terms of case management and resolution of motions tied to an understanding of the technology, platform markets, and the transactions at issue). In contrast, Android and iOS do not use the “exact same technologies” and the business models of these two

1 ecosystems, though in competition with each other, are materially different.

2 Android and iOS compete to attract app developers and end users, but the conduct
3 underlying their competition—and at issue in these two separate sets of lawsuits—is
4 distinct. While Apple’s iOS allows the distribution of apps only through Apple’s proprietary app
5 store, Android devices, in contrast: (1) can have multiple app stores simultaneously pre-installed
6 or downloaded and (2) allow for end users to sideload apps via the Internet. That means Android
7 app developers can distribute apps through multiple Android app stores, work directly with
8 OEMs or carriers to preload apps, and distribute apps to users directly from their own
9 websites. As a result, Apple and Google each have their own separate and unique negotiations
10 and contracts with app developers and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). These
11 fundamental differences in the way Apple and Google support app distribution create key
12 distinctions in the claims and defenses in the iOS/Apple Cases and Android/Google Cases.²

13 Although there is some overlap with certain named plaintiffs—e.g., Epic has filed suit in
14 both *Epic-Apple* and *Epic-Google*—and the app developer classes—i.e., developers can create
15 both iOS and Android versions of their app—this overlap is insignificant from a “relation”
16 perspective. The operative facts relating to the business strategies and app distribution policies
17 that underlie the claims in the iOS/Apple Cases are different from those in the Android/Google
18 Cases. *See Tecson*, 2019 WL 1903263, at *3 (“Even if there was some overlap between classes,
19 the operative facts for the putative classes would still make them substantially different.”).

20 ***Little Duplication of Labor and Expense or Risk of Conflicting Results.*** The
21 Android/Google Cases and iOS/Apple Cases are in very different procedural postures, making it
22 unlikely there will be meaningful efficiencies created through relation. The iOS/Apple Cases are
23 related to a consumer class case, *In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation*, No. 11-cv-06714-YGR,
24 that was filed in 2011 and is set for class certification proceedings in 2021 and trial in
25 2022. *Cameron-Apple* is proceeding on the same schedule. The *Epic/Apple* matter appears to be
26 proceeding on an expedited schedule. In contrast, no Google entity has been served in *Epic-*
27

28 ² This Response does not suggest that claims against Apple in the iOS/Apple Cases have merit.

Google or Carr-Google and only two of five Google defendants were served in PSB-Google (on August 21, 2020). Once served, and only after the initial scheduling is worked out, Google will challenge the complaints, in large part based on circumstances unique to Android, just as it did in *Feitelson v. Google, Inc.*, 80 F. Supp. 3d 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2015). These differences in procedural posture make it unlikely that there will be an unduly burdensome duplication of labor and expense, and given the different defendants and operative facts, there is little risk of conflicting results. *Cf. Pepper*, 2019 WL 4783951, at *2 (relating cases when “[a]ll three cases are currently in a similar procedural posture and have yet to begin substantial discovery and so efficiency gains will be achieved in discovery” and “the fact that both sets of plaintiffs seek injunctive relief [against Apple] presents a sufficient risk of inconsistent results to warrant relation”).

II. The Android/Google Cases All Relate To Each Other

While the three Android/Google Cases are related to each other, Google believes that alongside Judge Chen’s referral to Judge Donato, under Local Rule 3-12, the cases also need to be referred to Judge Freeman as they “may be ... related” to *Feitelson-Google*.³ Civ. L.R. 3-12(b). These cases each allege claims against Google defendants based on Google’s contracts with app developers and its policies within the Android ecosystem. The chart below summarizes the *Feitelson-Google* case and each of the three Android/Google Cases in order of their filing.

Case, No. (Judge)	Plaintiff / Type	Defendants	Property, Transaction or Event
<i>Feitelson v. Google Inc.</i> , No. 5:14-cv-02007 (Freeman, J.)	Gary Feitelson and Daniel McKee / Putative consumer class	Google, Inc.* *Converted to Google LLC in 2017	Android OS Google Search Google’s MADA Google Play Store
<i>Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC et al.</i> , No. 3:20-cv-05671	Epic Games / Individual app developer	Google LLC Google Payment Corp. Google Ireland Ltd.	Android OS Google’s MADA Google Play Store

³ Each of the plaintiffs in the recently-filed Android/Google Cases—Epic, Mary Carr, and Pure Sweat Basketball—agreed to litigate disputes with Google “exclusively” in Santa Clara County, i.e., in the San Jose Division for federal court cases. See Google DDA, §16.8, available at <https://play.google.com/about/developer-distribution-agreement.html>; Google Terms of Service, Section “Settling disputes, governing law, and courts”, available at <https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=en-US>. Judge Freeman is the only judge currently assigned an Android/Google Case (*Carr-Google*) who presides in the San Jose Division.

(Donato, J.)		Google Commerce Ltd. Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.	Google's Developer Distribution Agreements ("DDA")
<i>Carr v. Google LLC et al.</i> , No. 5:20-cv-05761 (Freeman, J.)	Mary Carr / Putative consumer class	Google LLC Google Payment Corp. Google Ireland Ltd. Google Commerce Ltd. Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.	Android OS Google's MADA Google Play Store Google's DDA
<i>Pure Sweat Basketball, Inc. v. Google LLC et al.</i> , No. 3:20-cv-05792 (Chen, J.)	Pure Sweat Basketball / Putative app developer class	Google LLC Google Payment Corp. Google Ireland Ltd. Google Commerce Ltd. Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.	Android OS Google's MADA Google Play Store Google's DDA

The three recently-filed cases each concern the same open mobile OS (Android) and challenge the same Google Play policies, so there is a potential risk of inefficiencies and conflicting results if those cases are heard before different Judges. The earlier filed case, *Feitelson-Google*, was pending in this district and dismissed by Judge Freeman in 2015. *See Feitelson v. Google, Inc.*, 80 F. Supp. 3d 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting motion to dismiss). The same counsel who represented the *Feitelson* plaintiffs also represent the plaintiff in *PSB-Google*, and both complaints allege the same theory of anticompetitive harm: Google's use of MADAs to purportedly foreclose competition in the relevant markets alleged in each complaint. Both complaints allege *inter alia* that under Google's MADA, OEMs can only preload "must-have" Google apps if the OEM agrees to preload a bundle of Google apps (including Google Play), which allegedly forecloses competitive apps from being preloaded. *See, e.g., Feitelson-Google*, Dkt. No. 31, FAC ¶ 7; *PSB-Google*, Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 7. The *Epic-Google* and *Carr-Google* cases allege substantially similar legal theories. *See, e.g., Epic-Google*, Dkt. No. 1, Compl., ¶¶ 56-57; *Carr-Google*, Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 33-34.

* * *

Google therefore respectfully requests that the Court decline to relate *PSB-Google* to *Cameron-Apple* or *Epic-Apple*.⁴

⁴ Google has filed this initial Response in the lowest-numbered case identified on Judge Chen's Sua Sponte Referral Order. Google also intends to file in due course: (1) a response to Judge Chen's Sua Sponte Referral on the docket for *Epic-Google* (before Judge Donato), and (2) an administrative motion as required by Civ. L.R. 3-12(b) to consider whether the Android/Google cases "may be" related to *Feitelson-Google*, which "was pending" before Judge Freeman.

1 Dated: September 3, 2020

By /s/ Brian C. Rocca
Brian C. Rocca
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
Attorneys for Google LLC